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ESTATE AND PROBATE LAW-TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF NON-
PROBATE ASSETS: WHETHER IRAS ARE COMPARABLE TO LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES AND WHETHER TESTATORS SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHANGE AN
IRA BENEFICIARY BY WILL. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark.
App. 75, _ S.W.3d _.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most courts have held that any attempt to change the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy by will is ineffectual where the policy "specifies the
manner in which the change may be made."' Rather, a policyholder must
adhere to the insurance company's procedure for amending a beneficiary
designation in order for a modification to be valid.2 Contrary to the consen-
sus of a vast majority of the states, Arkansas law recognizes testamentary
changes to insurance beneficiaries as long as the insurance policy to be
changed is specifically identified, and the testator's intent to change the be-
neficiary is clear.' Arkansas courts, however, have not been confronted with
the issue of whether this unique doctrine should be extended to other non-
probate assets until recently. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs4 considered
whether a purported amendment to a beneficiary designation by holographic
will effectively changed the beneficiary of an individual retirement account
(IRA).'
In Estate of Grubbs, the decedent named Nunnenman as the sole bene-
ficiary of his IRA.6 On the account, Nunnenman "was identified by name,
social security number, and date of birth."7 Two years later, the decedent
died following a brief hospitalization Significantly, days before his death,
1. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 3, _ S.W.3d _, _ (citing
Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Effectiveness of Change of Named Beneficiary of Life
or Accident Insurance Policy by Will, 25 A.L.R.4th 1164, 1167-68 (1992)).
2. Id,__ S.W.3dat .
3. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 261 Ark. 230, 235, 547 S.W.2d 118, 121
(1977) (holding testamentary language purporting to devise all the testator's "property and
estate, real, personal and mixed wherever located" was insufficient to identify the insurance
policies in question or establish the requisite intent). See also Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026,
1030, 105 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1937) (reasoning that when a beneficiary "provision in the will
conflict[s] with the provision in the policy," the will should control because it is "the in-
sured's last expression on the subject").
4. 2010 Ark. App. 75, - S.W.3d .
5. Id. at 1-2, __ S.W.3d at. IRAs will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.C.
6. Id. at 1,4, S.W.3dat
7. Id. at4, S.W.3dat .
8. Id. at 1,__ S.W.3dat.
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the decedent executed a last will and testament that left his entire estate to
his mother, Shervena Grubbs.9 Although the IRA was not specifically refe-
renced in the will, Ms. Grubbs argued she was the rightful beneficiary."°
She attempted to support her argument by proffering a handwritten note that
purportedly changed the beneficiary designation on the decedent's IRA from
Nunnenman to Ms. Grubbs."
The appellate court refused to uphold the testamentary change to the
decedent's IRA12 The importance of this case, however, rests in dicta
where the court insinuates it would have affirmed the district court's exten-
sion of the law for insurance policies to IRAs if the handwritten note had
qualified as a valid holographic will.'3 In her dissent, Judge Hart strongly
urges that this is inappropriate due to important differences between IRAs
and life insurance policies. 4
The standard required to validate life insurance beneficiary changes by
will seems relatively easy to satisfy: 1) specifically identify the account and
2) ensure that the testator's intent to change the beneficiary is clear. 5 Al-
lowing testamentary changes to beneficiaries of non-probate assets can lead
to many problems, including an increased risk of fraud and unnecessary
litigation, which arguably defeats the purpose of non-probate assets. IRAs
serve a different purpose than that of life insurance policies; therefore, the
court's apparent willingness to directly extend the law applying to life insur-
ance policies was in error. By comparing Arkansas's reasoning with that of
other states as well as federal law, this note will show that if the courts wish
to allow testamentary changes to IRAs and other non-probate assets, a much
more coherent and strenuous test should be applied. 6 In order to encourage
people to comply with company policies regarding beneficiary changes,
testamentary disposition of non-probate assets should be the exception ra-
ther than the rule.
This note will begin by explaining the relevant reasoning in Estate of
Grubbs.7 Next, it will discuss the history and general agreement among
other states with regard to the testamentary disposition of life insurance pol-
icy proceeds. 8 Then, the history of Arkansas's unique approach will be
9. Id., S.W.3d at _.
10. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 1-2, __ S.W.3d at.
11. Id., S.W.3dat _.
12. Id. at2, S.W.3d at .
13. See id at 3-6, __ S.W.3d at __ ("[T]he cases involving insurance policy beneficia-
ries, cited by appellant, are analogous and instructive.").
14. Id. at 10-11, _ S.W.3d at (Hart, J., dissenting).
15. E.g., Allen v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 261 Ark. 230, 235, 547 S.W.2d 118,
121 (1977).
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.1.
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established, followed by a brief section comparing and contrasting Arkansas
law with that of other states. 9 After that, this note will examine the inherent
differences between life insurance policies and IRAs and will argue that
such distinctions require IRAs to be treated differently than life insurance
policies by not allowing testamentary changes to IRA beneficiaries." Alter-
natively, if Arkansas courts choose to allow testamentary changes to IRA
beneficiaries, this note will propose that courts should require such changes
to meet a more rigorous standard than the current standard used to validate
testamentary changes to life insurance beneficiaries.2 Finally, the note will
conclude with a brief summary and restatement of the pertinent issue and
arguments.2"
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Court's Reasoning in Estate of Grubbs
As executrix of the estate, the decedent's mother, Ms. Grubbs, filed an
injunctive action to freeze the assets of the decedent's IRA. 3 Ms. Grubbs
asserted that a note she had discovered in the decedent's Bible effectively
removed Nunnenman and named Ms. Grubbs as the beneficiary.24 The
handwritten note said, "I Donnie Grubbs want all of my estate [a]ll IRA and
any SBC Telco and all other assets and worldly goods to go to my Mother
Shervena Grubbs. Being of sound mind. 25
The trial court found the note to be a valid will, and as such, it ex-
tended Arkansas's law for life insurance policies to the IRA.26 Consequent-
ly, the court held that the note effectively changed the beneficiary of the
decedent's RA. 27 The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision, however, finding that the note could not possibly qualify as a valid
will. 8 The court explained that because the note was not a valid will, "the
19. See infra Part I.B.2.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 1, _ S.W.3d __,.
24. Id. at 1-2,__ S.W.3d at.
25. Id. at 5,__ S.W.3dat.
26. Id., S.W.3d at.
27. Id. at 2, 5, S.W.3d at.
28. Id. at 5-6, __ S.W.3d at __ ("[I]f the note is regarded as a holographic will, it was
revoked by the express terms of decedent's last will and by operation of law pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 28-25-109(a)(1)."). In order to execute a valid will, a testator must be at least
eighteen years old and must sign the end of the will in the presence of at least two attesting
witnesses who must also sign the will at the request and in the presence of the testator. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-25-101, -103 (LEXIS Repl. 2004). Arkansas statutory law recognizes holo-
graphic wills as valid where the entire will is written in the testator's handwriting, the testator
20111
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rule permitting change of beneficiaries in a will ha[d] no application to it,
and [Ms. Grubbs] had the burden of proving that [the] decedent intended for
the note to be a change of beneficiaries and did everything reasonably poss-
ible to effectuate a change of beneficiary."29
Dissenting from the majority, Judge Hart argued that IRAs should be
treated differently than life insurance policies because IRAs are a type of
pay-on-death (POD) account.3" This distinction is important because POD
accounts are controlled by an entirely different statutory scheme than insur-
ance policies.3 Additionally, as a general rule, "life insurance policies al-
ways pay money to a designated beneficiary; that is their purpose. Con-
versely, a pay-on-death designation in an IRA is a contingency that few of
us hope will occur."32
B. Other States' Laws Regarding Testamentary Changes to Beneficiaries
of Life Insurance Policies as Compared with Arkansas Law
As with most written agreements, courts typically look to the language
of the document to determine what rights the parties have and how they may
exercise those rights.3 Life insurance policies are no different. 4 Most poli-
cies specifically stipulate the method by which an insured may change the
beneficiary of the policy. Some policy agreements expressly prohibit testa-
mentary changes while others expressly allow them, and some policies do
not directly address the issue.35
This section will begin by discussing the reasoning of other states re-
garding testamentary changes to life insurance policies. Next, it will explore
the history of the Arkansas law that permits such testamentary alterations.
signed the end of the will, and at least three credible, disinterested witnesses can testify that
the handwriting and signature do in fact belong to the testator. Id. § 28-25-104. A holograph-
ic will needs no attesting witnesses to be valid. Id. Additionally, "[a] will or any part thereof
is revoked by a subsequent will which revokes the prior will or part expressly or by inconsis-
tency." Id. § 28-25-109(a)(1).
29. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 6, _ S.W.3d at _. The appellate court was
also troubled by the fact that the only person who could benefit from the note's validation
was the person who supposedly discovered it. Id. at 5, - S.W.3d at.
30. Id. at 11, __ S.W.3d at_ (Hart, J., dissenting).
31. Id.,_ S.W.3d at _ (Hart, J., dissenting)
32. Id., __ S.W.3d at _ (Hart, J., dissenting).
33. Id at 2-3, __ S.W.3d at . See also 16 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 49:14-49:15 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasizing that courts will seek to interpret the
policy as a whole, giving meaning to every policy provision; however, if there are conflicting
provisions, the court will seek to effectuate the intention of the parties, often construing the
policy in favor of the insured).
34. See LORD, supra note 33, § 49:14.
35. See Wakefield, supra note 1, at 1167.
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1. Consensus Among Other States
The view adopted by the vast majority of states requires life insurance
policyholders to abide by methods set out in their policy in order to effec-
tuate a change to the named beneficiary.36 The general rationale behind this
view is that the insurer only contemplates changes to the beneficiary desig-
nation during the insured's lifetime.37 Once the insured dies, the benefi-
ciary's interest in the proceeds becomes vested; therefore, because a dece-
dent's will becomes effective at her death, any attempt to change the benefi-
ciary provision by will would be ineffectual as the decedent would no longer
have any interest in the proceeds.38 In cases where the named beneficiary
predeceases the insured, some courts have validated testamentary disposi-
tion of insurance proceeds, reasoning that the beneficiary's expectancy dis-
appears when the beneficiary dies because the insured is still living, and she
may elect to name a new beneficiary or even to let the policy expire.39 If the
insured has not named a new beneficiary by the time of her death, the
proceeds of the life insurance policy revert to the insured's estate, making
them subject to testamentary disposition.40
Another view is that testamentary changes to beneficiary designations
are justified when the insurance company has "waived its policy require-
ment of strict compliance with the provisions for making a change of bene-
ficiary."'" For instance, in cases where an insurer has filed a bill of inter-
pleader and deposited the insurance proceeds with the court, some courts
have held that the insurer's actions constituted a waiver of the provisions of
the policy that prescribe the procedure for amending the named beneficiary
on the policy."2 These courts have honored testamentary changes to benefi-
36. Id. See e.g., In re Bunnell, 322 B.R. 331, 335-36 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (citing
Stone v. Stephens, 99 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ohio 1951); Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co., 194
N.E.2d 577, 579-580 (Ohio 1963)) ("[U]nder Ohio law, any attempt to change the benefi-
ciary of a life insurance policy through a will is generally not recognized. The only exception
. . . is if such a change was authorized by the policy and then only if communicated to the
insurer.").
37. Wakefield, supra note 1, at 1167. This assumes the insured has reserved the power
to designate a new beneficiary. Id.
38. See id. at 1169-70. Several states have adopted this approach, including California,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 1168-69.
39. Seeidat 1172.
40. See id. Allowing the policy proceeds to revert to the insured's estate when the bene-
ficiary predeceases the insured has the same effect as if the insured had made the life insur-
ance policy payable to her estate in the first place.
41. Id. at 1173-74.
42. Id. at 1174. See also Curt A. Kramer, Comment, In the Matter of the Estate of
James B. Morse: Is A Testamentary Change Designating Another Beneficiary to an IRA
Effective?, 9 CONN. PROB. L.J. 131, 132-35 (1994) (discussing In re Estate of Morse, 568
2011]
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ciaries.43 On the other hand, courts that have held that this act does not con-
stitute a waiver have invalidated testamentary changes to life insurance poli-
cies.'
2. Arkansas Law
The Arkansas rule allowing testamentary changes to life insurance be-
neficiaries is well established.45 Currently, the rule is applied as follows:
"Arkansas holds that a change of beneficiary can in fact be accomplished in
a will so long as the language of the will is sufficient to identify the insur-
ance policy involved and an intent to change the beneficiary."46 The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court first endorsed this principle in 1937 with its decision in
Pedron v. Olds.47 In Pedron, the decedent had two policies of life insur-
ance.48 After he suffered a stroke of paralysis, the decedent's wife separated
from him. 49 His wife was listed as the beneficiary on both life insurance
policies; " in his will, however, the decedent precisely described the two
policies and instructed that the proceeds of each be paid to his daughter.5
The decedent never attempted to follow the provisions of the life insur-
ance policies, which prescribed the manner and mode by which a change of
N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sur. Ct. 1991) in which the court held testamentary changes to IRAs are al-
lowed when the IRA account is identified "by exact title and number[ ] and where the custo-
dian of the account waived the requirements of written notice to effectuate a change"). When
the custodian of an account voluntarily deposits the funds of the account in court, it thereby
becomes a stakeholder and forfeits its right to enforce the agreement. Id. at 138. If the court
is in possession of the policy proceeds, the insurer is no longer susceptible to double liability,
and, therefore, testamentary changes to the beneficiary designation are allowed. Id. at 135-
36. Even though the account at issue was an IRA, the Morse court applied New York's law
regarding testamentary changes to life insurance policies to reach its conclusion.
43. Wakefield, supra note 1, at 1174. Missouri, Arizona, and New York's case law
establishes that such a waiver may allow testamentary disposition of life insurance proceeds.
Id.; Kramer, supra note 42, at 135-36.
44. Wakefield, supra note 1, at 1173. Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, South Carolina, and
Texas have all rejected this principle of waiver. Id.
45. See generally Allen v. First Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, 261 Ark. 230, 235, 547
S.W.2d 118, 121 (1977) ("While our cases recognize that a change of beneficiary can be
accomplished by will .... ); Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193 Ark. 1155, 1158, 104 S.W.2d 814, 815
(1937) (recognizing the "insured might effect a change of beneficiaries by will"); Pedron v.
Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 1030, 105 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1937) (allowing beneficiary designation to be
changed by will).
46. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 3-4, _ SW.3d ,.
47. 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1937).
48. Id. at 1026, 105 S.W.2d at 70.
49. Id. at 1027, 105 S.W.2d at 70.
50. Id. at 1026, 105 S.W.2d at 70.
51. Id. at 1027, 105 S.W.2dat 70-71.
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beneficiary was to be effectuated.52 The court reasoned that "the provisions
in the policies ... relating to change in beneficiary were made for the bene-
fit and protection of the insurer, as well as for the benefit of the insured."53
The court went on to explain the purpose for having policy provisions re-
quiring the insured to take certain steps in order to alter a beneficiary desig-
nation-to ensure the insurer pays the appropriate person when the insured
dies." The court cited authority that supported this public policy interest:
It is in the public interest that an insurance company may pay a loss to
the beneficiary designated in the policy as promptly after the death of the
insured as may reasonably be done. If there is uncertainty as to the bene-
ficiary upon the death of [the] insured, in all cases where the right to
change the beneficiary had been reserved there would always be a ques-
tion as to whom the proceeds of the insurance should be paid... [I]t
would be a risk that few companies would be willing to take, unless
some specified time had elapsed after the death of [the] insured, or that
there had been some court adjudication as to whom the proceeds should
be paid.55 Nevertheless, the court did not believe testamentary changes to
beneficiary designations would significantly affect insurers' interests.
56
Rejecting the reasoning of other states that the named beneficiary's in-
terest becomes vested immediately upon the death of the policyholder, the
court held that both the beneficiary designation and the testamentary clause
were provisions that became operative upon the death of the insured." The
Pedron court noted, "The provision in the will conflicted with the provision
in the policy designating [the] appellant as beneficiary, and this being the
insured's last expression on the subject, it ought to control. 58
In 1977, the Arkansas Supreme Court further defined the rule allowing
testamentary changes to life insurance beneficiaries in Allen v. First Nation-
al Bank of Fort Smith.59 In Allen, the decedent's ex-wife was the named
beneficiary on several policies of insurance, which the decedent had ob-
52. Id., 105 S.W.2d at 71. The policy provided, "Every change of beneficiary must be
made by written notice to the company at its home office accompanied by the policy for
indorsement of the change thereon by the company, and unless so indorsed the change shall
not take effect." Id. at 1026, 105 S.W.2d at 70.
53. Pedron, 193 Ark. at 1029, 105 S.W.2d at 71.
54. Id., 105 S.W.2d at 71.
55. Id. at 1030, 105 S.W.2d at 72 (quoting Wannamaker v. Stroman, 166 S.E. 621, 623
(S.C. 1932)).
56. Id. at 1029, 105 S.W.2d at 71-72.
57. See id. at 1030, 105 S.W.2d at 72.
58. Id., 105 S.W.2d at 72. This statement demonstrates Arkansas's preference for satis-
fying the interests of the insured even at the expense of other interested parties, namely the
beneficiary and the insurer.
59. 261 Ark. 230, 235, 547 S.W.2d 118, 121 (holding the policy must be sufficiently
identified and testator must have had intent to effectuate a change of beneficiary).
2011]
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tained during their marriage.6" After the decedent and his ex-wife were di-
vorced, he executed a written instrument, titled "Change of Beneficiaries of
Life Insurance Policies," that explicitly stated he wanted his ex-wife's name
removed from the beneficiary designation on the insurance policies and the
proceeds to be payable to his estate.6" This instrument was never given to the
insurance company; rather, it stayed with the decedent's lawyer.62 The court
held: (1) divorce did not automatically bar the ex-wife from receiving the
insurance proceeds as a beneficiary;63 (2) the written instrument left at the
lawyer's office did not constitute substantial compliance with the relevant
policy provision;' and (3) the decedent's will could not effectuate a change
of beneficiary because it did not specifically identify the policies or demon-
strate intent.65
There is a notable statutory exception to Arkansas's approach. 66 Bene-
ficiaries to life insurance policies obtained through a benefit society may
only be changed in accordance with the laws or rules of the society.
67
Therefore, unless a benefit society's policy expressly provides for testamen-
tary disposition, an insured's attempt to devise an interest in the proceeds of
such an insurance policy is futile.68
60. Id. at 232, 547 S.W.2d at 119.
61. Id. at 232-33, 547 S.W.2d at 119. The decedent wanted his estate to be distributed
to a trust for the benefit of his three children. Id. at 233, 547 S.W.2d at 119-20.
62. Id. at 233, 547 S.W.2d at 120. Similar to the policy in Pedron, the relevant provi-
sion stated that
Any Insured who has not made an irrevocable designation of beneficiary may
designate a new beneficiary at any time, without the consent of the beneficiary,
by filing with the American Geriatrics Society a written request for such change,
but such change shall become effective only upon receipt of such request at the
Home Office of the Company. When such request is received by the Company,
whether the Insured be then living or not, the change of beneficiary shall relate
back to and take effect as of the date of execution of the written request, but
without prejudice to the Company on account of any payment theretofore made
by it.
Id., 547 S.W.2d at 120.
63. Id. at 235,547 S.W.2d at 120-21.
64. Id., 547 S.W.2d at 121.
65. Allen, 261 Ark. At 235, 547 S.W.2d at 121.
66. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-74-402 (LEXIS Repl. 2004). This exception demon-
strates that there are, and should be, limits to Arkansas's rule allowing testamentary changes
to insurance beneficiaries.
67. Id. See also Cheatham v. Modem Woodmen of Am., No. 3:10cvOO170 SWW, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48544, at *13-15 (E.D. Ark. May 4, 2011) (discussing the differences "in
the contractual relationship between fraternal benefit societies and regular insurance compa-
nies," which necessitates "a more formal process for members and policy holders ... to
change the beneficiary of an annuity certificate issued by a fraternal benefit society").
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-74-402; Cheatham, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48544 at *15-16
(citing Gibson v. Moore, 187 Ark. 897, 901, 63 S.W.2d 344, 346 (1933)).
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C. What Is an IRA and How Does It Compare to Other Non-probate
Assets?
Generally speaking, an IRA69 is a device individuals use for the "pur-
pose of saving and investing for the future., 70  A written instrument that
establishes a trust or custodial account used to collect assets is necessary in
forming an IRA, and typically, a bank acts as trustee.7' "An IRA must be
established for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his beneficiary," and
it must be maintained in strict compliance with the rules of the Internal Rev-
enue Code.72
The concept of an IRA was established by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 197471 (ERISA), which sought to "enhance horizon-
tal income tax equality by providing new vehicles for individual retirement
savings, and to promote pension fund portability."74 Prior to the passage of
ERISA, a relatively small percentage of the American population actually
benefitted from the tax incentives of retirement savings programs: "overly
restrictive age and service requirements for participants in corporate and
self-employed plans ...characteristically excluded many employees."75
The IRA provisions of ERISA were created with the purpose of allowing
more Americans to take advantage of retirement savings tax benefits, en-
couraging the development of "the private retirement savings system," and
promoting mobility for American workers.76
This section will first address federal law concerning IRAs. Then, it
will discuss Arkansas law concerning non-probate assets and their disposi-
tion.
69. For a discussion of IRAs generally, see Louis A. Mezzullo, The Basics of Retirement
Plan Distribution, PROB. & PROP. May-June 1989, at 43, 43-45. The beneficiary designation
does not necessarily have to be an individual. Id at 44. It is important to recognize the ability
of an account owner to designate a trust as the IRA beneficiary, which can lead to an entire
realm of other considerations. Id. As this is outside the scope of this note, these considera-
tions will not be addressed.
70. Robert E. Craine, Individual Retirement Accounts, 11 TuLSAL.J. 215, 216 (1975).
71. Id. at216-17.
72. Id. at 217. There are different types of IRAs, including investment IRAs, individual
retirement annuities and qualified retirement bonds, employer-sponsored IRAs, and rollover
IRAs. See generally id. (discussing in detail the different types of IRAs).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
74. Craine, supra note 70, at 215 n.2.
75. Id. at216.
76. Id.
2011]
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1. Federal Law
ERISA requires benefit plans to "specify the basis on which payments
are made to and from the plan"" and commands fiduciaries to administer
plans "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan., 78  It also expressly pre-empts state laws that relate to an ERISA
plan.79 State laws "relate to" an ERISA plan when they have "'a connection
with or reference to such a plan."'
80
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner,g' the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a Washington statute was pre-empted by ERISA.82
The statute provided that, upon divorce, there would be an automatic revo-
cation of any beneficiary designation naming an ex-spouse as the benefi-
ciary of a non-probate asset.83 The Court reasoned that the statute impli-
cated core ERISA concerns in three ways. 84 First, the statute ran counter to
the plain language of ERISA.85 Second, the statute interfered with national-
ly uniform plan administration.86 If forced to comply with this state law,
"administrators [could not] make payments simply by identifying the bene-
ficiary specified by the plan documents," rather, they would be forced to
"familiarize themselves with state statutes so that they [could] determine
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4) (2006).
78. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
79. Id. § 1144(a).
80. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (quoting Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
81. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
82. Id. at 146,
83. Id. at 143. For a discussion considering why revocation by divorce statutes should
apply to life insurance policies and arguably other non-probate assets, see generally Alan S.
Wilmit, Note, Applying the Doctrine of Revocation by Divorce to Life Insurance Policies, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 653 (1988) (reasoning that the policy behind revocation statutes revolves
around the fact "that people have difficulty accepting their own death," and it is comparable
to the purpose and goals of life insurance policies). Forty-four states have enacted revoca-
tions statutes that provide in pertinent part, "[i]f after executing a will the testator is divorced
or his marriage annulled, the divorce... revokes any disposition or appointment of property
made by the will to the former spouse . i.." "d  at 653. Arkansas has adopted such a statute.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
"The general rule is that divorce in no way affects the rights of an ex-spouse as a
beneficiary of a husband's nonprobate assets." James F. Walsh, Note, The Effect of Divorce
on the Beneficiary Rights to a Nonprobate Asset, 7 CONN. PROB. L.J. 163, 164 (1992). Nev-
ertheless, some courts continue to look to property settlements and other actions by the par-
ties to determine whether the owner intended for the ex-spouse to remain the beneficiary. Id.
at 164-65. Still, other jurisdictions have resolved the issue altogether by enacting statutes
that remove the ex-spouse from the beneficiary designation by operation of law. Id. at 165.
84. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 148.
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whether the named beneficiary's status ha[d] been 'revoked."'' 87 Third, the
congressional goal of minimizing expenses would be impaired if administra-
tors were compelled to "master the relevant law of [fifty] [s]tates. 88 In the
Court's opinion, "[D]iffering state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's
'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the
burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid."'
89
The Supreme Court of the United States again acknowledged that an
ERISA plan must be administered in accordance with the written terms of
the agreement creating the retirement asset in Kennedy v. Plan Administra-
tor for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan.90 Kennedy involved a man who
failed to change the beneficiary designation on his savings and investment
plan, which named his ex-wife as the beneficiary, following a divorce.91
Although his ex-wife had signed an agreement specifically waiving her
rights to his savings and investment plan,92 the Court ruled that she was en-
titled to the proceeds.93 According to ERISA, a qualified domestic relations
order (QDRO) or disclaimer would have been recognized, which would
have changed the outcome of this case.94 However, the plan administrator of
the retirement account did not recognize the waiver signed by the ex-wife,
and a QDRO was never filed.95
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
ex-wife's waiver based on ERISA's anti-alienation provision that requires
retirement plans to specify "that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."96 Under this provision, if retirement plans provide
that benefits cannot be "assigned" or "alienated," then any agreement,
87. Id. at 148-49.
88. Id. at 149-50 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
89. Id. at 150 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 428 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)). The
Court mentioned that some state statues (such as "slayer" statutes) might not be pre-empted
because they are relatively uniform across the nation and, therefore, arguably do not impose a
burden on administrators. Id. at 152. The Court did not rule on this issue, however, as it was
not before the Court. Id.
90. 555 U.S. 285, 288 (2009). See also Patricia L. Vannoy, Note, R.LP.: The Federal
Common Law Waiver Approach to Retirement Plan Death Benefits Finally Rests in Peace
After Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 497 F.3d 426
(5th Cir. 2007), aft'd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009), 88 NEB. L. REv. 204 (2009) (discussing the Fifth
Circuit's holding that extraneous documents and agreements, even if binding on the parties
pursuant to state law, were not binding on the retirement plan at issue in Kennedy).
91. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 289.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 304.
94. Id. at 296. The court made clear, however, that the ex-wife could not merely waive
her right to collect the proceeds of the retirement plan with a QDRO. Id. Instead, she would
have to redirect her interest to another beneficiary. Id. at 296-97.
95. Id. at 288.
96. Id. at 290-91; 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006).
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whether it be direct or indirect, "whereby a party acquires from a participant
or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or
any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to the
participant or beneficiary" is invalid.97 The Supreme Court held, however,
that the waiver was not invalid as a result of ERISA's anti-alienation provi-
sion, but that it was properly disregarded because it conflicted with the be-
neficiary designation in the plan documents.98
It is important to note that ERISA does not govern all IRAs. ERISA is
only implicated when an employer maintains the plan. Furthermore, it is not
applicable if all four of the following conditions are met.99 First, the em-
ployer or employee association must not make any contributions to the
IRA) °° Second, the employee's participation must be voluntary."l ' Third,
the employer's involvement must be solely to permit the plan's sponsor to
advertise the program to employees, collect contributions through payroll
deductions, and forward employee contributions to the sponsor.0 2 Fourth,
the employer must not receive consideration "other than reasonable com-
pensation for services actually rendered in connection with payroll deduc-
tions or dues checkoffs.' °3
2. Arkansas Law
Several Arkansas statutes allow a decedent's property to pass to his be-
neficiaries outside of probate. For example, Arkansas has enacted the Uni-
form Transfer on Death Security Registration Act, which allows the estab-
lishment of transfer-on-death (TOD) designations for securities.' 4 Also,
with respect to bank accounts, Arkansas statutory law provides that "[t]he
designation of ownership interest contained in account documents shall be
conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding involving the deposit ac-
count of the intention of all depositors to vest title to the deposit account in
the manner specified in the account documents."'0 5 With regard to invest-
ment accounts, however, a different rule applies, and Arkansas case law
97. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (2011).
98. Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 288.
99. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (2010).
100. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(i).
101. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(ii).
102. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 2510.3-2(d)(1)(iv). Generally, ERISA does not apply to traditional IRAs, but it
does apply to employer-sponsored IRAs, Simplified Employee Pension plans (SEPs), Sav-
ings Incentive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLE IRA), and deemed IRAs. See 6 SAL L.
TRIPODI, THE ERISA OUTLINE BOOK 13A. 16-13A. 18 (2011 ed. 2011).
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-14-104 to -107 (LEXIS Repl. 2004). TOD and POD designa-
tions are forms of beneficiary designations, which allow property to pass outside of probate.
105. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-47-204(b)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
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establishes that an account designation is only a presumption of the holder's
intent. 0 6  Additionally, courts are permitted to accept parol evidence re-
garding the donative intent of a deceased with regard to an investment ac-
count, even in the absence of fraud.'0 7 Hall v. Superior Federal Bank"8 illu-
strates this rule.
In Hall, the decedent opened a savings account with Superior Federal
Bank ("Superior").'0 9 The signature card included two names-the dece-
dent's and Mrs. Hall's."' The names were listed "'as joint tenants with right
of survivorship and not as tenants in common, and not as tenants by the enti-
rety.""' ".. After the decedent's death, Superior issued a check to Mrs. Hall
"constituting the principal amount in the savings account plus unpaid and
accrued interest.""' 2 Subsequently, upon discovering that the Pulaski Pro-
bate Court had issued an injunction prohibiting the bank from distributing
the account funds, the bank contacted Mrs. Hall and told her "the check
would not be honored.""' 3 A similar situation occurred when Mrs. Hall at-
tempted to collect funds from a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch that
had been designated as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.' 14 The
trial court ruled that the decedent had a confidential relationship with Mrs.
Hall, and the decedent never intended for the funds in either account to pass
to Mrs. Hall.' Affirming in part, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that
the Arkansas statute deeming account designation to be conclusive evidence
of the account holder's intent does not apply to investment accounts. "6
Thus, the account designation on the Superior savings account was deemed
conclusive evidence of the decedent's intent, but the account designation on
the Merrill Lynch account was not.17
Additionally, it is worth noting that Arkansas, along with approximate-
ly half of the states, recognizes beneficiary deeds." 8 Arkansas statutes, such
106. Hall v. Superior Fed. Bank, 303 Ark. 125, 131-32, 794 S.W.2d 611, 614 (1990).
107. Id. at 135-36, 794 S.W.2d at 616.
108. 303 Ark. 125, 794 S.W.2d 611 (1990).
109. Id. at 127, 794 S.W.2d at 612.
110. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 612.
111. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 612 (quoting the language on the security card).
112. Id. at 128, 794 S.W.2d at 612.
113. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 612.
114. Hall, 303 Ark. at 127-28, 794 S.W.2d at 612.
115. Id. at 128, 794 S.W.2d at 613.
116. Id. at 131-32, 794 S.W.2d at 614.
117. Id., 794 S.W.2d at 614-15.
118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608 (LEXIS Supp. 2011). For a discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of beneficiary deeds, see generally Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-
Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & T R. J. 529
(2006). "Many people choose to avoid the probate process, either because of concerns about
delays and cost or because of a desire for privacy." Id. at 531. Gary points out several advan-
tages of transfer on death deeds including the ability of the owner to retain control of the
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as the beneficiary deed statute, make it relatively easy for property to pass
non-probate." 9 This statute expressly provides that "[a] beneficiary deed
that complies with this section may not be revoked, altered, or amended by
the provisions of the owner's will."' 2°
III. ARGUMENT
A. IRAs Are Inherently Different Than Life Insurance Policies and Thus
Require Separate Treatment Under the Law
One scholar noted, "If A pays money to B and B in return promises to
make payments on A's death to C, the validity of this transaction in most
states will turn on whether B is an insurance company, the United States, or
a bank."'' The reason behind this outcome is that the applicable rules vary
depending on the type of non-probate asset at issue. As Judge Hart ex-
plained in Estate of Grubbs, Arkansas courts should first address the inhe-
rent differences between IRAs and life insurance policies before a blanket
extension of the rule allowing testamentary changes to life insurance benefi-
ciaries is applied to IRAs and other non-probate assets.1
22
"The differences between a life insurance policy and an IRA with a
pay-on-death designation are profound."'' 23  First, IRAs and life insurance
policies have different purposes. While individuals use IRAs to provide for
themselves in the future,124 life insurance policies are generally used to pro-
vide for the insured's dependents in the event of the insured's death.'25
property, reduced costs, and protection from dishonest relatives. Id. at 542-43. Among the
disadvantages she recognizes are the opportunity for legal mistake if planners are not expe-
rienced; the challenges that may come after the owner's death, which could result in addi-
tional litigation; the confusion that could result from conflicting documents purporting to
dispose of the property; and the reality that selling the property may not be possible until
such issues are resolved thus contributing to inconvenience and, potentially, increased costs.
Id. at 543-46.
119. ARK. CODEANN. § 18-12-608.
120. Id. at § 18-12-608(d)(4). By making it easy for people to plan for their property to
pass non-probate, the legislature is arguably expressing a preference for the non-probate
disposition of property. Furthermore, one could argue that Arkansas should amend its exist-
ing law to prohibit life insurance policies from being changed by will, thus bringing life
insurance in line with all of the other types of non-probate transfers. That argument would
require a different approach and is outside the scope of this note.
121. William M. McGovern, Jr., The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substi-
tutes, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 7, 10 (1972-1973).
122. See Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 10-11, _ SW.3d ,
(Hart, J., dissenting).
123. Id., _ S.W.3d at _ (Hart, J., dissenting).
124. Craine, supra note 70, at 216.
125. See Carl Richards, Why Life Insurance Is Not an Investment, N.Y. TIMEs, April 12,
2010, available at http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/why-life-insurance-is-not-an-
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Second, IRAs and life insurance policies have different tax consequences. 26
Third, and most importantly, IRAs are unique non-probate assets because
certain IRAs are subject to federal legislation. 27 As a result, IRAs are inhe-
rently different from life insurance policies. For example, the benefits of
life insurance policies, even those established under ERISA, are freely
alienable. 128  Conversely, when ERISA applies, IRA benefits are not.
While some state rules are certainly applicable to the distribution of IRA
assets, it is worthwhile to note that IRAs are generally governed by "prin-
ciples of contract law and banking law rather than by principles of wills
law.' 12
9
Additionally, courts should be hesitant to extend a rule that would blur
the line between probate and non-probate administration. As evidenced by
sections 18-12-608(d)(1) and 23-47-204(b)(3) of the Arkansas Code, Arkan-
sas law favors the non-probate disposition of beneficiary deeds and multiple
party deposit accounts. 3 ° Similarly, federal law prevents the testamentary
disposition of IRA benefits when the plan is controlled by ERISA. For
these reasons, IRAs warrant treatment separate from life insurance policies
under the law.
investment/. "It's not for education savings. It's not for retirement savings, or to provide a
tax-free loan later in life." Id.
126. Compare I.R.C. § 408(d) (2011), with § 101(a)(1).
127. See supra Part II.C.1.
128. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 429 (5th
Cir. 2007), aff'd, 555 U.S. 285 (2009) (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1988)).
129. Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts & Administration of Estates, 54 MERCER L. REv.
583, 605 (2002) (discussing SunTrust Bank, Middle Ga., N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419
(2001) in which the Georgia appellate court reversed a trial court decision that gave effect to
the change of an IRA beneficiary designation). Harper involved an instance of guardianship
in which the IRA owner's "power to make contracts, the power to buy or sell property, and
the power to enter into any other business or commercial transaction" had been removed. Id.
at 603. The court-appointed guardian took the IRA owner to the bank and had him change
the beneficiary designation on the account. Id. at 604. The trial court found that the change
was effective because it was testamentary rather than contractual in nature, and the power to
make a will had not been removed from the IRA owner in the guardianship proceeding. id. at
605. "The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding, finding that the IRA was go-
verned by general principles of contract law and banking law rather than by principles of
wills law." Id.
130. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-12-608(d)(1) (LEXIS Supp. 2011) (prohibiting testamentary
disposition of beneficiary deeds); § 23-47-204(b)(3) (LEXIS Repl. 2004) (making any desig-
nation purporting to transfer property at the account holder's death conclusive evidence of
intent).
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B. Courts Should Require Testamentary Changes to IRA Beneficiaries to
Meet a More Rigorous Standard Than That Used for Life Insurance Policies
Extending the law regarding testamentary changes to beneficiaries of
life insurance policies to IRAs would not only run contrary to the law of
other states, it would impose an undue burden on courts, individuals, and
financial institutions. As the Egelhoff Court explained, state laws affecting
an administrator's ability to identify the beneficiary from the plan docu-
ments implicate core ERISA concerns. 13' According to ERISA, certain IRAs
must be administered "in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan."' 3 2 Arkansas's rule allowing testamentary changes to
life insurance policies cannot be extended to IRAs governed by ERISA be-
cause, even if applicable under state law, it is pre-empted by federal law.
Additionally, Arkansas's rule should not be applied to IRAs that are unaf-
fected by ERISA because it would be cumbersome for courts, individuals,
and financial companies to attempt to apply different rules to different types
of IRAs. As a result, all IRAs should be administered according to the plan
documents.
The relevant plan provision in Estate of Grubbs read as follows:
I understand that if I designate "my will" or some variation thereof as my
Beneficiary, that the Custodian shall interpret this term as my estate and
that if I do not designate any Beneficiary, my Beneficiary shall also be
deemed to be my estate. I understand that I may revoke this beneficiary
designation at any time by completing and submitting a new beneficiary
designation, which shall supersede all prior beneficiary designations.
Such replacement designation shall be submitted on either a form pro-
vided by the Custodian for this purpose and/or in some other manner
deemed acceptable to the Custodian. 1
33
The plan provision did not intend for the decedent to have the ability to
change the beneficiary designation without notifying the custodian of the
account. In fact, the provision required approval by the custodian of the
account to make an effective change to the beneficiary designation in some
manner other than by submission of a replacement designation form.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals, however, did not decide Estate of
Grubbs with regard to this argument-the plan provision was merely men-
tioned with no elaboration as to its consequences or application to the facts
of this case.1"' Instead, the appellate court found that the decedent's last will
and testament, which was executed shortly before his death, was insufficient
131. Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(D) (2006). See also supra Part II.C.1.
133. Nunnenman v. Estate of Grubbs, 2010 Ark. App. 75, at 4, __ S.W.3d __ .
134. Id., S.W.3dat_.
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to effectuate a change of beneficiary because the IRA was not specifically
identified. 1 '
The next issue addressed by the appellate court was whether a note,
found by the decedent's mother, was an effective holographic will that
changed the beneficiary designation on the IRA. 136 Although the court ulti-
mately ruled that the validity of the handwritten note was irrelevant,'37 this
reasoning, in effect, runs contrary to that of the Supreme Court of the United
States. In Egelhoff and Kennedy, the Court applied federal law to hold that
the beneficiary should be determined from the plan documents, 3 ' while the
Arkansas Court of Appeals seemingly extended a rule unique to the state.
Without further explanation and consideration of the distinctive characteris-
tics of IRAs and the federal laws that pre-empt state laws in some circums-
tances, the Arkansas court's application of the law in Estate of Grubbs was
incorrect.
While the Arkansas courts may not be totally barred from allowing a
testamentary change to an IRA beneficiary, such an exception should be
required to meet elements more strict than the lenient test necessary to effec-
tuate a change of beneficiary for life insurance policies.'39 For instance, the
135. Id.,__ S.W.3dat _.
136. Id. at 5, S.W.3d at .
137. Id. at 5-6, __ S.W.3d at
138. See supra Part II.C.1.
139. Testamentary disposition of non-probate assets puts the popularity of non-probate
administration in jeopardy, prevents financial intermediaries from distributing non-probate
assets quickly, and exposes financial intermediaries to liability for erroneous disbursements if
testamentary dispositions of non-probate assets can override "previous disbursements made
by financial intermediaries." Mark L. Kaufmann, Note, Should the Dead Hand Tighten Its
Grasp: An Analysis of the Superwill, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1988). Contra Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall & Anthony J. Aiello, The Superwill Debate: Opening the Pandora's Box?,
62 TEMP. L. REV. 277, 310-15 (1989) (arguing that the laws protect financial institutions such
as banks and life insurance companies from wrongful payment lawsuits and situations where
the financial institution pays the designated beneficiary on a non-probate asset prior to receiv-
ing notice of the testamentary disposition); Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation
and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155
(2008). Schenkel argues that the non-probate system itself frustrates efficiency in post-death
asset disposition simply because it cannot possibly dispose of all assets; the only document
able to dispose of an entire estate is the will, and therefore the will, rather than non-probate
documents, should be the primary tool for the disposition of assets. Id. at 156.
Testamentary transfer legislation and techniques should focus on brevity, sim-
plicity and efficiency. These goals can be best achieved only by unifying the
process of testamentary transfer under a single instrument. Fortunately, a unify-
ing instrument already exists. Only by executing a will can a person, without tak-
ing any further legal steps, transfer all of a wide variety and number of property
interests, effective on death, by way of one legal document.
Id. Schenkel further points out that unless legislation specifically eradicates the will, it will
never completely go away. Id. at 178. Since this is unlikely to happen, Schenkel argues that
estate planning should utilize wills to create a unified administration of asset disposition. Id.
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custodian of the IRA should receive notification of the testator's intent to
change the beneficiary on the policy. Substantial compliance with the plan
provisions would promote public policy that favors holding parties account-
able for the agreements that they make.
14
Furthermore, substantial compliance would minimize the opportunity
for fraud because, at the very least, the testator would have taken steps to-
ward changing the beneficiary in accordance with the plan documents. Such
action would allow parties to more definitively establish the testator's intent
in court according to the rules of evidence. Also, the administrator of the
account is more likely to be on notice of the account holder's intent to
change the beneficiary if substantial compliance is required. Finally, it is
unlikely significant injustice will result from requiring plan participants to
substantially comply with plan provisions because "[t]he importance of
keeping your beneficiary designations current is not a secret reserved for the
nation's ERISA experts; it is a common topic""14 familiar to the general pub-
lic.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the law permitting a change to the beneficiary of a life insurance pol-
icy by will is extended to IRA accounts, it is reasonable to assume that Ar-
kansas could expand this rule to include other non-probate assets, such as
POD accounts, TOD accounts, and beneficiary deeds. Such an expansion
would arguably obliterate one of the purposes of non-probate assets and
muddy the distinction between probate and non-probate administration. The
federal government's pre-emptive regulation of certain IRAs seeks to
achieve uniformity among the states in retirement accounts' creation, main-
tenance, and disposition. If Arkansas extends its unique approach to benefi-
ciary changes for life insurance policies to IRAs, the federal government's
aim at uniformity will be frustrated.
Under Arkansas law, all that must be shown in order for a court to va-
lidate a testamentary change to a life insurance beneficiary is that the docu-
ment purporting to make the change satisfies the necessary requirements to
be a valid will, the policy to be changed is clearly identified, and the testa-
tor's intent to effectuate a change in beneficiary is clear. Because the Ar-
kansas test required to effectuate testamentary changes to life insurance be-
140. For a discussion of how probate and non-probate procedures affect third parties such
as creditors, see generally Elaine H. Gagliardi, Remembering the Creditor at Death: Aligning
Probate and Nonprobate Transfers, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 819 (2007) (arguing there
is an obvious need to unify conflicting property distribution rules so that creditors' rights to
certain assets are clearly understood, which would in turn promote efficiency and diminish
unnecessary costs by reducing the need for litigation).
141. Vannoy, supra note 90, at 227.
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neficiaries does not require substantial compliance with the policy provi-
sions, the test is too lenient to extend to IRAs.
At the very least, contestants of the beneficiary designation should be
required to show that the testator substantially complied with the policy pro-
visions by demonstrating (1) the testator made significant steps to attempt to
change the IRA beneficiary by the manner and mode prescribed in the poli-
cy, and (2) but-for his death, the testator would have complied with the poli-
cy provisions. This more demanding test would ensure the overall nature of
the non-probate asset remains intact. Furthermore, it would encourage ac-
count holders to comply with the policy provisions that established the IRA
account in the first place, thus keeping in line with the spirit of federal poli-
cy objectives.
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